Pilot error versus sociotechnical systems failure:a distributed situation awareness analysis of Air France 447 by Salmon, Paul M et al.
1 
 
Pilot error versus sociotechnical systems failure? A 
distributed situation awareness analysis of Air France 447 
 
Paul M. Salmon1, Guy H. Walker2 Neville Stanton3 
 
1The Centre for Human Factors and Sociotechnical Systems, 
Faculty of Arts and Business, University of the Sunshine Coast, Maroochydore, QLD 4558, Australia 
2 School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK 
3 Transportation Research Group, University of Southampton,  
Highfield, Southampton, SO51 7JH, UK. 
 
Abstract 
The Air France 447 crash occurred in 2009 when an Airbus A330 stalled and fell into 
the Atlantic Ocean, killing all on board. Following a major investigation the French 
accident investigation authority concluded that the incident resulted from a series of 
events that began when the autopilot disconnected after the aircraft’s Pitot tubes 
froze in an adverse weather system. The findings place scrutiny on the aircrew’s 
response to this, pointing to their lack of awareness of what was going on and of 
what procedure was required, and their subsequent failure to control the aircraft. 
This reflects a tendency for accident investigations to cite poor or loss of situation 
awareness on behalf of pilots as a key causal factor in aviation incidents. This article 
argues that this is inappropriate, instead offering a systems level view that can be 
used to demonstrate how systems, not individuals, lose situation awareness. This is 
demonstrated via a distributed situation awareness description of the events 
preceding the crash. The findings demonstrate that it was the sociotechnical system 
comprising aircrew, cockpit and aeroplane systems that lost situation awareness, 
rather than the aircrew alone. In closing, the importance of taking a systems view 
when examining concepts such as situation awareness during accident events is 
articulated. 
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Introduction 
On the 31st May 2009 Air France flight AF447 stalled and crashed into the Atlantic 
Ocean, killing all 228 people on board. Following a major investigation, the Bureau 
d’Enquetes et d’Analyses (BEA), the French authority responsible for civil aviation 
accident investigations, concluded that the accident resulted from a succession of 
events that began when the aircraft’s Pitot tubes froze upon entry into an adverse 
weather system and ended when the aircraft stalled and fell, at around 11,000ft per 
minute, into the ocean. Inevitably, the investigation report places significant 
emphasis on the aircrew’s inability to understand and respond to the situation that 
arose following the freezing of the Pitot tubes, whereby the autopilot disconnected 
and the plane required manual control. Following some confusion the pilots’ were 
seemingly unaware that the plane had entered a stall and was descending rapidly 
towards the ocean. Specifically, the BEA reported that the crew failed to make a link 
between the loss of indicated airspeeds and the appropriate procedure, made a late 
identification of the deviation from flight path, and failed to identify the approach to 
stall and subsequent stall situation itself (BEA, 2012). The following extract 
translated from the black box voice recorder clearly demonstrates the level of 
confusion on the flight deck (Popular Mechanics, 2011): 
 
02:11:21 Pilot Not Flying (PNF): We still have the engines! What the hell is 
happening? I don't understand what's happening. 
3 
 
02:11:32 Pilot Flying (PF): Damn it, I don't have control of the plane, I don't have 
control of the plane at all! 
02:11:37 PF: Left seat taking control! 
02:11:43 Captain (returning from rest): What the hell are you doing? 
02:11:45 PF: We've lost control of the plane! 
02:11:47 PNF: We've totally lost control of the plane. We don't understand at all... 
We've tried everything. 
 
The conclusions regarding the aircrew’s role in the incident relate directly to the 
concept of situation awareness (Endsley, 1995); specifically the aircrew’s 
understanding of the unfolding situation following the autopilot’s disconnection. The 
findings presented in the investigation report allege that the aircrew were not aware 
of various aspects of flight and of what procedure was required, and so could not 
respond to the unfolding situation in an appropriate manner. This is not a unique 
position to take in accident investigation reports, and reflects a trend in which human 
operators are implicated for their role in accidents due to having ‘lost situation 
awareness’ or because they had ‘poor situation awareness’ (Dekker, 2015). This 
focus on human operators and their own awareness remains despite systems 
thinking (e.g. Leveson, 2004; Rasmussen, 1997) now being widely accepted as the 
most appropriate approach to accident investigation (Underwood and Waterson, 
2014). This viewpoint clearly articulates that accidents are caused by the interaction 
of the decisions and actions of multiple human and technical elements, rather than 
one failure in isolation.  
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Recently researchers have questioned this fixation on loss of situation awareness, 
citing moral, ethical, and theoretical issues associated with labelling an individual’s 
loss of situation awareness as the cause of incidents (e.g. Dekker, 2015; Salmon et 
al, 2015). This article builds on these arguments by demonstrating that this 
inappropriate and perhaps misunderstood use of situation awareness threatens its 
potential contribution to safety science (Salmon and Stanton, 2013). Particularly 
problematic is the fact that focussing on individual cognition during accident 
investigation inevitably leads to countermeasures which focus on fixing human 
operators through avenues such as retraining and reprisals, an approach that has 
long been known to be inappropriate (Dekker, 2002; Reason, 1997). What makes 
this state of affairs more worrying is that, in ignoring advances in the human factors 
knowledge base and returning to individual operator-focussed concepts, our 
discipline may no longer be doing what it should be – supporting the design of safe 
sociotechnical systems in which humans are viewed as assets rather than the 
source of problems. 
 
In order to remain useful in accident investigation and accident prevention efforts, it 
is these authors’ opinion that a shift in the way in which situation awareness is 
considered in the aftermath of adverse events is required. Specifically, it is argued 
that situation awareness can only be meaningful in this context when considered 
from a systems perspective; that is, when situation awareness plays a role in 
incidents, it is the system itself that loses situation awareness, not the individuals 
working within it (Salmon et al, 2015).  Why the system lost situation awareness 
should then be the explicit focus of accident investigations, not which individuals lost 
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situation awareness and what cognitive flaws made this possible. This argument is 
articulated through first briefly outlining a systems level model of situation 
awareness, known as Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA; Salmon et al, 2009: 
Stanton et al, 2006), and second through presentation of a DSA-based analysis of 
the Air France incident. Together the model and the analysis demonstrate the utility 
of systems thinking in the context of situation awareness and its role in adverse 
events.  
 
Situation awareness: something that is held by people or by systems? 
Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) 
Although much early research on situation awareness focussed on the awareness 
held by individual human operators (e.g. pilots, drivers, soldiers), as evidenced by 
this special issue, there has been a significant shift over the last decade towards 
models that view situation awareness as a systems level phenomena (e.g. Stanton 
et al, 2006; Salmon et al, 2009). Based on a program of research focussing on 
command and control systems in defence and civilian domains, Stanton et al (2006) 
and Salmon et al (2009) proposed a model of DSA that attempted to shift the unit of 
analysis from individuals and teams to sociotechnical systems. Inspired by Hutchins 
seminal work on distributed cognition, the DSA model argues that situation 
awareness is an emergent property that is held by the overall system and is built 
through interactions between ‘agents’, both human (e.g. human operators) and non-
human (e.g. tools, documents, displays). Further, the model purports that situation 
awareness is not held by any one agent alone but instead resides in the interactions 
occurring across the sociotechnical system. 
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There are various in-depth descriptions of the DSA model presented in the literature 
(see Salmon et al, 2009; Stanton et al, 2009) and no doubt in this special issue. 
There are, however, some important facets worth discussing here. In the original 
paper specifying the DSA model, Stanton et al. (2006) indicate how the system can 
be viewed as a whole, by consideration of the information held by the human and 
non-human agents and the way in which they interact. The dynamic nature of 
situation awareness means that it changes moment by moment, in light of changes 
in the task, environment and interactions (both social and technological). DSA is 
considered to be activated knowledge for a specific task within a system at a specific 
time by specific agents. Whilst this can be conceptually challenging from a cognitive 
psychology perspective, from a systems perspective it is not (e.g. Hutchins, 1995; 
Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2004; Wilson, 2012).   
 
Stanton et al (2015) clarify this by describing how systems have a network of 
information elements, linked by salience, being activated by tasks and belonging to 
different agents – something akin to a hive mind of the system (Seeley et al, 2012). 
Within this network nodes are activated and deactivated as time passes in response 
to changes in the task, environment and interactions. Viewing the system as a 
whole, it does not matter if humans or technology own this information, just that the 
right information is activated and passed to the right agent at the right time. Further, 
it does not matter if the human agents do not know everything, provided that the 
system has the information and enables it to perform effectively (Hutchins, 1995).  
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Agents are able to compensate for each other, enabling the system to maintain safe 
operation.  
 
A key facet of the DSA model is the notion of ‘transactions’ between agents as the 
mechanism that enables a system to maintain DSA throughout the course of a task. 
A transaction in this case represents an exchange of situation awareness between 
agents and so refers to more than the mere communication of information to 
incorporate the resulting impacts on DSA (see Neville et al, this issue). Agents 
interact with one another, receive information, it is integrated with other information 
and acted on, and then passed onto other agents (Stanton et al, 2009). The 
interpretation of that information changes per agent. For example, information 
regarding airspeed may rightly be used and interpreted differently by the Pilot Flying 
(PF) and the Pilot Not Flying (PNF), as it is integrated with other information to 
enable each to perform their own tasks. The exchange of information between 
agents also leads to transactions in the situation awareness being passed around; 
for example, a pilot’s request for information gives clues to the other pilot what the 
other agent is working on.  Both are using the information for their own ends, 
integrated into their own schemata, and reaching an individual interpretation. 
Aspects of situation awareness from one agent can form an interacting part of 
another’s without any necessary requirement for parity of meaning or purpose. 
Notably, it is these transactions that hold the key to safe and efficient performance 
within aviation and indeed other complex sociotechnical systems; without them, the 
system cannot maintain the appropriate level of situation awareness required to 
achieve its goals. Post accidents, this means that investigators need to understand 
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not only what awareness was lost, but what transactions involving human and non-
human agents were either inadequate or were required but not forthcoming. 
 
DSA and accident investigation 
This systems level view demands a different approach to accident investigation. 
Importantly, it means that judging a pilot to have poor situation awareness alone 
becomes almost meaningless, because this is not placed in the context of the 
systems DSA. Indeed, the arguments presented in this paper centre around the 
notion that loss of situation awareness by any individual cannot possibly be labelled 
as the cause of an accident. Not because loss of situation awareness doesn’t 
happen, rather, because focussing on individuals losing situation awareness is 
neither appropriate nor useful. This is because, systems hold situation awareness 
and therefore lose situation awareness, not the individuals working within them.  
 
When loss of situation awareness seems to have played a role in an adverse event, 
accident investigators need to examine why the system’s DSA was degraded, not 
who lost awareness. For example, investigations should ask questions such as why 
were the aircrew were not aware of something important? Why did the requisite 
transactions not occur? Why did the system not have enough DSA? When ‘loss of 
situation awareness’ takes place, is it not appropriate to begin with the individual and 
try to expand outwards. Rather, in line with DSA, a systems approach is required, 
whereby one starts with the system and focuses inwards.  Especially important are 
the transactions in awareness that occurred in the lead up to the incident.  
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Situation awareness networks 
Rather than try and understand the ‘component’ humans in the system by analysing 
their individual cognition, DSA bypasses this by focussing on the interactions and 
transactions between them.  By focussing on transactions, it is possible to generate 
situation awareness networks comprising concepts and the relationships between 
them (see Figure 1 which shows an extract of such a network). This effectively 
provides a picture of the systems awareness at different points in time. Through 
further interrogation it is possible to determine who in the system had access to what 
knowledge at different points in time (e.g. Stanton et al, 2006).  Moreover, it is 
possible to trace the impact of the transactions (or lack of transactions) over time; in 
turn this makes it possible to model the degradation of a system’s awareness in the 
lead up to the adverse event. This approach has been successfully applied in 
various domains for various purposes, including accident investigation (e.g. Griffin et 
al, 2008; Rafferty et al, 2012; Salmon et al, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 1. Example situation awareness network showing relationships between concepts. 
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For example, based on a DSA-based analysis of the Kegworth Boeing 737-400 
crash, Griffin et al (2008) found that various transactional failures played a key role in 
the crash. Further, Griffin et al (2008) concluded that failures in transactions lie at the 
root of all adverse aviation events and that, when examining them, one should not 
distinguish between human and non-human agents.  
 
Air France 447 case study  
The tragic events of Air France 447 provide an appropriate case study to further 
examine the extent to which the DSA perspective can be usefully applied to the 
analysis of accidents in complex sociotechnical systems. Accordingly, situation 
awareness networks were used to examine the events leading up to the Air France 
flight AF 447 incident. The aims of the study were to test the notion that, in modern 
day accidents, loss of situation awareness can be meaningfully considered at a 
systems level, as opposed to an individual operator level, and to further examine the 
utility of the situation awareness network method as an accident investigation 
approach. 
 
The Air France crash and timeline of events 
In order to understand the Air France incident and the context in which it occurred it 
is first necessary to describe the timeline of events leading up to and including the 
incident. The overview presented below is based on the information presented in the 
BEA investigation report (BEA, 2012). 
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The incident occurred on the 31st May 2009 during a scheduled passenger flight from 
Rio de Janerio, Brazil, to Paris, France. Just over three and a half hours after 
departure, at approximately 2.02am Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), the Captain 
left the flight deck to take a scheduled rest break. Shortly afterwards, at 2.03.44am, 
the PF noted that the plane had entered the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), 
which is an area close to the equator that experiences consistently severe weather. 
The PF subsequently called through to a flight attendant to warn of impending 
turbulence and the need to take care. The aircraft’s anti-icing system was then 
turned on. 
 
Upon entry into the ITCZ the aircrafts pitot tubes froze due to the low air 
temperature. Shortly before 2.10am an alert sounded in the cockpit to notify the 
pilots that the autopilot was disconnecting. At 2.10.06am, the PF remarked, “I have 
the controls” and was acknowledged by the PNF. Following this, the PF put the 
aeroplane into a steep climb by pulling back on his sidestick, triggering a stall 
warning which subsequently sounded 75 times for the remainder of the flight. The 
plane gained altitude rapidly but lost speed quickly. The PF continued to apply nose 
up inputs with the PNF apparently unaware of this. Eventually the aeroplane went 
into a stall and began to lose altitude. After trying unsuccessfully to identify the 
problem and an appropriate procedure, the PNF called the Captain back into the 
cockpit. At 2.11.32am, the PF announced “I don’t have control of the plane”. At 
2.11.37am the PNF took control of the aeroplane. Six seconds later the Captain 
returned to the cockpit and subsequently attempted to diagnose the situation. Both 
the PF and PNF informed the Captain that they had lost control of the aircraft and did 
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not understand why. At 2.13.40am the PF told the Captain that he had ‘had the stick 
back the whole time’, at which point the PNF took control of the plane and applied 
nose down inputs in an attempt to prevent the stall and gain speed. Unfortunately 
these actions were taken too late, and at 2.14.29am the voice recorder stopped as 
the plane crashed into the ocean. 
 
DSA analyses typically involve describing a systems awareness across distinct task 
phases (Stanton et al, 2013). For the purposes of the present DSA analysis the 
incident was decomposed into the following key phases: 
 
1. Phase 1. Entrance into the ITCZ until autopilot system disconnection. 
2. Phase 2. Aircrew’s initial response to autopilot disconnection 
3. Phase 3. Return of Captain to cockpit 
 
The analysis involved constructing situation awareness networks for each of the 
three phases. 
 
Methodology  
Initially, one human factors analyst with significant experience in applying the DSA 
model, the situation awareness network method, and the application of accident 
analysis methods  in various domains constructed situation awareness networks for 
each of the three phases. This component of the analysis used the ‘Analysis’ section 
of the BEA investigation report (section 2 of the report, pgs. 167 – 182 which details 
the unfolding events following entry into the intertropical convergence zone) along 
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with a translation of the corresponding cockpit voice recordings as the primary data 
inputs.  
 
The network construction process involved reviewing the information in the report 
and transcript to identify situation awareness concepts (e.g. nodes in the networks 
e.g. pitot tubes, ice) and the relationships between them (e.g. Pitot tubes  Ice). For 
example, from the sentence “From 2 h 01, the PF mentioned the subject of the ITCZ, 
turbulence and the choice of flight level in his briefing to the co-pilot who joined him 
as relief for the Captain” (BEA, 2012, p169), the concepts ITCZ (Intertropical 
Convergence Zone), turbulence, flight level and briefing were extracted. In addition, 
relationships between ‘briefing’ and ‘ITCZ’, ‘turbulence’ and ‘flight level’ were 
recorded. This process enabled an overall situation awareness network to be built for 
each of the three event phases. 
 
An additional aspect of the analysis involved identifying aspects of situation 
awareness that the report described the pilots or cockpit systems as not having (and 
thus representing the ‘lost’ parts of situation awareness). Missing concepts were 
identified by extracting concepts that the report suggested that the aircrew or cockpit 
systems should have known. For example, from the sentence “the PNF did not 
consider the warning to be relevant in the context of the fact that he was not 
necessarily aware of: The PF’s significant nose-up inputs that generated an 
increased angle of attack; The relative proximity of a flight envelope limit; The 
reconfiguration to alternate law” (BEA, 2012, p173-174), the missing concepts ‘PFs 
control inputs’, ‘Proximity to flight envelope limit’ and ‘Mode change (reconfiguration 
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to alternate law’ were identified. This process produced a list of missing situation 
awareness concepts associated with each situation awareness network. These 
represent the pieces of information that the pilots could have used to help 
understand the situation, respond appropriately, and prevent the adverse outcome 
that occurred. 
 
Upon completion of the initial analyses, the first analyst (analyst 1) was joined by an 
additional human factors analyst with extensive experience in applying DSA and 
accident analysis methods (analyst 2). The two analysts then recoded the BEA 
investigation report and refined the original networks, with any discrepancies or 
disagreements’ being resolved through discussion until consensus was reached. 
Finally, a third analyst (analyst 3), also with extensive experience in applying DSA 
and accident analysis methods reviewed the BEA investigation report and 
constructed situation awareness networks for each phase independently, identifying 
relevant and missing situation awareness concepts and the relationships between 
them. A subsequent comparison of third analyst’s coding with the coding from 
analysts 1 and 2 revealed a percentage agreement of 91% for the concepts within 
the situation awareness network, and 75% agreement between them for the missing 
concepts. The three analysts then subsequently met and resolved any differences to 
produce the final networks presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4. A comparison of the 
agreement between the relationships between concepts identified by the analysts 
was not undertaken as it was out of the scope of the present study; however, little 
disagreement was encountered when finalising the networks. 
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Results  
The situation awareness networks for phases 1, 2 and 3 are presented in Figures 2, 
3 and 4. Where appropriate important contextual pieces of information are shaded 
within the networks. For example, in the phase 1 network below the airspeed 
concept is shaded (as this information triggered the autopilot disconnection) along 
with the warnings that signalled the autopilot disconnection and the disconnection 
itself. In addition, the missing concepts for each phase are listed on the right hand 
side of each Figure. 
 
 
Figure 2. Phase 1 situation awareness network 
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Figure 2 shows the situation awareness network covering the information being used 
between the entrance into the ITCZ and the autopilot’s disconnection. An important 
concept within this network is the airspeed concept – spurious airspeeds were sent 
to the cockpit because the pitot tubes were frozen. This transaction in awareness led 
to the autopilot disconnection and triggered the unfolding events. It is notable that 
this was a transaction between technological agents rather than human agents. The 
majority of the other concepts within the phase 1 network relate to standard flight 
parameters and systems.  
 
A number of missing concepts are also represented. The first relates to the PFs 
concern over the crossing into the Inter-tropical convergence zone. The PF had 
expressed a number of concerns over the crossing and suggested changing flight 
level to fly above the clouds; however, according to the report the Captain was 
unresponsive, instead favouring waiting and responding to any issues as they arose. 
The second concept is the loss of speed information – here the crew were alerted to 
the disconnection, but not the issue with the airspeeds. The third missing concept 
relates to the roles adopted by the PF and PNF during the Captains rest period. As 
the incident played out an assertion of authority is made by the PNF; however, no 
discussion was held over roles during the rest period. Similarly, the fourth missing 
concept relates to the instructions or strategy for crossing the inter-tropical 
convergence zone. According to the investigation report the Captain didn’t make any 
judgements on the situation that they faced crossing into the zone, and he didn’t 
leave any tactics or instructions for the crossing itself. The fifth missing concept here 
is the actual freezing of the pitot tubes – the report does not provide any information 
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to suggest that the pilots were aware of this. It appears that no transaction took place 
to alert the aircrew of this (although they would have been aware that freezing pitot 
tubes was an issue). The sixth and final missing concept ‘decision on climb’ relates 
to the fact that the Captain did not respond with a decision or strategy to the PFs 
request to climb above the cloud cover to avoid turbulence. 
 
Once the speed anomalies were detected, the autopilot disconnected, and this was 
signalled by both a visual and aural warning within the cockpit (see shaded concepts 
in Figure 2). Figure 3 shows the situation awareness network following the 
disconnection up until the Captain returned the cockpit. It is important to note that the 
period of time covered by the network in Figure 3 is approximately one minute and 
37 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 3. Phase 2 situation awareness network 
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The first thing to note is that the network for phase 2 is bigger and more complex – 
indicating a complex scenario in which information overload seemingly played a role. 
An important concept within the network for phase 2 is the PF’s control inputs 
(shaded). These were inappropriate, putting the aeroplane into a nose up climbing 
position. The investigation report identifies many pieces of information that the either 
the PF, PNF, or both, were not aware of during this phase. The first interesting group 
of missing concepts relate to the PFs control inputs. According to the report the PNF 
wasn’t aware of what control inputs the PF was making, and he wasn’t aware of what 
the PFs intentions around control inputs were as they were not communicated. An 
important note to make here is that, in the A330 the PFs sidestick control inputs 
cannot be observed easily by the other pilot so control input information represents 
both a human to human transaction and a non-human to human transaction in 
awareness. 
 
The second interesting group of concepts relate to the Electronic Centralized Aircraft 
Monitor display (ECAM). The ECAM monitors the aircrafts functions and systems 
and provides information the aircrew regarding failures and appropriate response 
procedures. According to the investigation report, initially the ECAM did not display 
any information pointing to a speed indication problem and also displayed a range of 
confusing messages. The report also highlights the fact that no relevant procedure 
was displayed via the ECAM (one of its primary functions). Another interesting 
concept that apparently wasn’t understood for a time was the reconfiguration to 
alternate law – it is suggested in the report that the pilots were not aware that the 
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plane had reconfigured to alternate law. A result of this is that they may have 
believed that the plane could not stall as it was being protected via the normal law 
flight mode. The stall warnings and indeed stall itself also feature in the missing 
concepts. According to the investigation report the crew did not refer to or discuss 
the stall warnings, which brings into question whether they were ever aware that the 
plane was in a stall situation. It is unclear why this was the case – the report cites the 
high workload associated with diagnosing the situation, and also the possibility that 
the pilots thought they were actually in an overspeed situation. This relates to the 
lack of awareness regarding the mode shift - if the PF did not understand that they 
were flying in alternate law he could have thought that it was impossible to stall the 
plane. A final interesting missing concept relates to the fact that Air Traffic Control 
couldn’t monitor the flight as there was a failure to connect with DAKAR Oceanic 
ACC. If this connection had been made then the loss of altitude would have 
generated an alert on the relevant air traffic controller’s screen. 
 
Figure 4 shows the situation awareness network from when the Captain returned to 
the cockpit to the point at which the plane impacted the ocean. 
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Figure 4. Phase 3 situation awareness network 
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Table 1. Examples of the transactions in awareness that either played a role in the incident or could 
potentially have prevented the incident 
Phase 1: Entry into tropical convergence zone to disconnection of autopilot 
Transaction Failure 
type 
Transaction required Agents involved 
Absent transaction When he left the cockpit for his rest 
break the Captain had not discovered 
the PF’s level of concern over crossing 
into ITCZ 
Captain and PF 
Absent transaction The risk of loss of speed information 
related to high density ice crystals was 
not discussed between the PF and the 
PNF 
PF and PNF 
 
Absent transaction Definition of co-pilot roles during 
Captain flight rest time 
Captain, PF and PNF 
Absent transaction Before leaving the cockpit for his rest 
break the captain did not leave any 
instructions regarding the ITCZ 
crossing 
Captain, PF and PNF 
Absent transaction No explicit indication in the cockpit 
informing the aircrew that the pitot 
tubes had frozen 
Pitot tubes, cockpit displays, 
PF and PNF 
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Inappropriate 
transaction 
Inappropriate airspeed information Pitot tubes and cockpit 
systems 
Phase 2: Aircrew’s initial response to autopilot disconnection 
Transaction Failure 
type 
Transaction required Agents involved 
Absent transaction   Reason for autopilot disconnect ECAM, PF and PNF 
Inappropriate 
transactions 
ECAM displays succession of 
messages 
ECAM, PF and PNF 
Absent transaction Appropriate action or procedure on 
ECAM 
ECAM, PF and PNF 
Absent transaction PF’s intentions/objectives regarding 
control and stabilisation of flight path 
PF and PNF 
Misunderstood 
transaction 
Stall warning (STALL 1 and STALL 2) Stall warning, PF and PNF 
Absent transaction PF’s control inputs  PF, PNF, Sidesticks 
Phase 3: Return of Captain to cockpit 
Transaction Failure 
type 
Transaction required Agents involved 
Absent transaction Discussion of stall warning PF, PNF and Captain 
Incomplete transaction Discuss sequence of events PF, PNF and Captain 
Misunderstood 
transaction 
Stall warning Stall warning, PF and PNF 
 
Based on the analysis presented it seems that four forms of transaction failure 
played a role in the incident. These include absent transactions, inappropriate 
transactions, incomplete transactions, and misunderstood transactions. Notably the 
agents involved in all forms of failed transaction were both human and non-human. 
Absent transactions involve instances where a transaction in awareness was 
required but was not initiated. This includes scenarios where the exchange should 
have happened but did not due to a failure of some sort and also scenarios where a 
transaction would have supported the systems DSA but at the time was not part of 
normal operation through inclusion in operating procedures or artefacts (e.g. 
documents, displays). Inappropriate transactions involve instances where a 
transaction in awareness was initiated, but the content of the transaction was 
incorrect. This includes scenarios where the human or non-human agent (e.g. 
display, document) initiating the transaction provided the wrong information or where 
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the awareness being exchanged was incorrect. Incomplete transactions involve 
instances where the appropriate transaction was initiated, but the delivery was 
incomplete; not all information was exchanged as required. Finally, misunderstood 
transactions involve instances where the receiver misunderstands the information or 
picture being transacted. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this article was to demonstrate that, in modern day accidents, loss of 
situation awareness can be meaningfully considered at a systems level. In addition, 
it is intended that the analysis presented would provide further evidence for the utility 
of using situation awareness networks as an accident analysis methodology.  
 
Who lost situation awareness? 
The arguments presented in the this article centre around the notion that, in most 
meaningful contexts situation awareness is not something that can be held by one 
individual alone, and therefore cannot be lost by one individual alone (Salmon et al, 
2015). The analysis presented shows that it was the sociotechnical system 
comprising aircrew, cockpit and aeroplane systems that lost situation awareness, 
rather than the aircrew alone. This is evidenced by the fact that multiple failed 
transactions in awareness played a part, and that these transactions were between 
non-human agents (e.g. cockpit systems and displays), between non-human and 
human agents (e.g. cockpit displays and pilots) and between human agents (e.g. PF 
and PNF). Interestingly, the initial transaction that led to the incident beginning was 
entirely between non-human agents (e.g. the pitot tubes and the cockpit systems). 
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Whereby the pitot tubes and eventually the cockpit systems lost awareness of the 
planes airspeeds. In addition, a key feature of the incident was the inability of the 
aeroplanes systems to clearly inform the PF and PNF of what was going on. This 
included why the autopilot had disconnected, what the appropriate procedure was, 
what actions the PF was taking in response to the situation, and the status and 
associated risk of key flight parameters. Finally, examining the information that was 
not communicated revealed that much of the information should have been provided 
by the cockpit’s systems. Given these characteristics of the incident it is 
inappropriate to point to a loss of awareness on behalf of the aircrew only. 
 
The implication of this is that countermeasures should focus on enhancing the 
transactions required during both routine and non-routine flight situations. For 
example, what information is required, how best it can be communicated in high 
workload situations, and who or what it should be communicated by are important 
considerations. The missing information surrounding the PF’s inappropriate control 
inputs provides an appropriate case in point. Here the PNF was not aware that the 
PF had been applying nose up inputs throughout the unfolding incident. By 
considering the role of non-human agents in DSA and examining the overall cockpit 
system (as opposed to the PF and PNF alone) it could be ascertained that this 
information should be communicated between the PF and PNF both verbally as part 
of the aircrew’s threat and error management activities and also by the cockpit 
systems (e.g. via sidestick feedback). This kind of approach provides an appropriate 
level of redundancy for flight operations. 
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Situation awareness networks for accident investigation 
The analysis presented provides further evidence for the suitability of using network 
analysis methods for accident analysis purposes. Specifically, the networks 
constructed were able to show where key pieces of information (or concepts) were 
either not understood or were simply not present in the system. A further benefit of 
this approach is that it is able to identify instances where required information is 
present within the system, but is not held by the agent or agents who require it. The 
outputs therefore enable investigators to pin point issues in the communication of 
information and facilitate the consideration of why situation awareness was lost and 
not a focus on who lost it. 
 
An additional contribution of the analysis presented is to build on Griffin et al (2008), 
Rafferty et al (2012) and Salmon et al’s (2011) use of DSA in examinations of 
adverse events by identifying a sub-set of transaction-related failures underpinning 
modern day sociotechnical system accidents. Based on the present and previous 
DSA analyses, four forms of transaction failure were identified. These include absent 
transactions, inappropriate transactions, incomplete transactions, and misunderstood 
transactions. It is these authors opinion that these failed transactions lie at the root of 
the accidents occurring in complex sociotechnical systems such as aviation, air 
traffic control, and process control. An important line of further research is the testing 
and validation of the transactional failures identified.  
 
The transactional failures described have some noteworthy features that are brought 
about by the distributed cognition and systems thinking perspectives underpinning 
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the DSA model. First, they can be applied to both human and non-human agents. 
The onus is not on human operators exchanging the wrong information or 
misunderstanding the information given to them. Rather, the onus is on the system 
and interactions between its components and so the issues can be associated with 
documents, displays, equipment and the general work environment. Nothing is off 
limits. Second, in line with systems thinking, it is the interaction between agents that 
are examined, rather than the agents themselves. For example, the focus is not on 
the pilot not being aware of something, instead it is on what interaction between 
agents that led to the appropriate awareness not being distributed as it should have 
been.  
 
As a case study analysis there are limitations associated with the analysis 
presented.  First is the fact that the analysis is based on the investigation report 
produced by the BEA and has not been verified by anybody involved in the 
investigation or the incident itself. It is not possible, therefore, to be sure that the 
networks presented are either complete or accurate. Indeed, it is likely that they 
present snapshots of the systems awareness rather than comprehensive 
descriptions of it. Second is the fact that a comparison of the agreement between 
analysts regarding the relationships between concepts identified was not 
undertaken. As mentioned this was not possible due to project constraints. Further, 
little disagreement was encountered when finalising the networks. Third and finally, 
the 75% agreement between analysts on the missing concepts could be criticised for 
being relatively low. The lower agreement rating for missing concepts was potentially 
found as the identification of missing concepts (as opposed to identifying present 
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concepts) was a new form of analysis not previously undertaken by the authors. In 
future agreement between analysts could be enhanced through detailed clarification 
on what exactly constitutes a missing concept. 
 
Conclusion 
Situation awareness is a key concept for safety science (Salmon et al, 2015); 
however, it is not possible to improve situation awareness, performance, and 
ultimately safety by focussing on individual operators in the aftermath of adverse 
events. Whilst this is now widely accepted for accidents generally, it has not 
translated to traditionally individual operator concepts such as situation awareness. 
The analyses presented has shown that a richer description of how situation 
awareness plays a role in adverse events is developed by assessing events through 
a systems lens. This viewpoint argues that it is systems, not individuals, that lose 
situation awareness and therefore that systems, not individuals, should be the focus 
when attempting to improve performance following adverse events. It is hoped that 
this approach is taken during the analysis of adverse events not only in aviation but 
also across the safety critical domains. 
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